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and the Rockefeller Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.Human capitalists often find themselves confronted with the charge
that the human capital framework, although consistent with empirical results,
does not appropriately capture the true direction of causality. In partic-
ular, Spence (1972) has argued that education may simply provide a signal
to employers of the applicant's ability and may not actually increase the
individual's productivity) Although the signalling hypothesis has impli-
cations with respect to the social returns to education which differ from
those of the traditional human capital story, the implications for the
individual are essentially the same. Regardless of whether schooling is a
screen or a truly productive asset, it is still traditional for theindividual
investor to acquire formal schooling up to the point where the present value
of additional education is equal to the cost of its acquisition. There is,
however, another motivation for the connection between schooling andwealth
which has implications at the level of the individual different from those
traditionally ascribed to human capital. Specifically, it can be claimed
that education is simply a normal consumption good and that like all other
normal goods, an increase in wealth will produce an increase in the amount
of schooling purchased. Increased incomes are associated with higher
schooling attainment as the simple result of an income effect. Bowles (1972),
for example, finds that 52% of the variation in levels of schooling can be
explained by family background variables. He argues that the exclusionof
these variables from earnings functions causes an upward bias in the estimated
returns to schooling.2 If this is so, schooling increases anindividual's
wealth only by the consumption value of the good, since it is a non—saleable
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asset. This paper will attempt to determine empirically the amount by
which an increase in wealth is caused by schooling as distinguished from
the amount by which the demand for schooling increases as the result of
an increase in wealth.
The problem then is to estimate the amount of education that would
be acquired in the absence of its consumptive benefits.3 There are two
conceptual ways to do this; one can measure the difference between the total
amount of education acquired and that amount which would be acquired in
the absence of the wealth—increasing properties of education. The residual
can then be called the investment component. This approach, for one thing,
requires that all uses of education as a consumption good be known. A
considerable amount of research has been done on the use of education in
non—market activities. Michael (1973), for example, claims that more
educated individuals consume other commodities as if they have higher wealth.
Libebowitz (1974) finds that an increase in a mother's level of education
is associated with a higher measured IQ for her child. In the areas of the
family, Michael (1973a) has found that more educated individuals are better
contraceptors and are thus less likely to experience an unwanted birth.
Benham (1974) finds that an increase in a woman's education is associated
with higher earnings on the part of her spouse, given his education.
Education thus can have an impact on an individual's health as well. Williams
(1974) finds that a child's birthweight (which is generally positively related
to its chance of survival) is also positively associated with parental
education, given family income. Additional examples can be given, but the
point is clear —educationaffects many aspects of an individual's behavior
in addition to its impact on his earnings capacity. Yet it would be extremely
.3
difficult to attempt to estimate the total impact that education has on
one's ability to consume. Nor, as it turns out, would this assist us in
disentangling consumption from investment components of educatjon.
There have also been attempts to establish the existence of an
education effect on worker productivity. Welch (1970, 1973) and Griliches
(1964, 1968), among others, have argued that education plays an important
role in the formation of and adaptation to technological change. An alter-
native approach is to treat the problem as one of finding the difference
between the wealth-maximizing and utility-maximizing levels of education.
In the model developed below, this is found to be a more conceptually
appropriate and empirically useful formulation of the problem.
A Model
Let us start by defining the opportunity set of values of goods
consumed (including leisure), c, and education "consumed", Ec, by the
individual. An individual starts out with an endowment (X,E) =(Xe,O).
He may convert resources into education according to the following relation-
ship, E =f(X)where X is the amount of resources/he production
of schooling (measured in terms of grades completed). f(X) is assumed
to be monotonic, continuous, and differentiable throughout. If X is the
numeraire commodity, then the individual may "sell" a unit of education for
the present price, E goods, where "present" is defined as the date of
birth. The individual sells his education by working at jobs which pay
higher wages to more educated individuals. It is assumed that the selling
price of all units of schooling are thesame.4 The individual then maxi—
mizes his wealth by producing education up to the point, E*, whereEducation is plotted along the horizontal axis and goods are plotted on
the vertical axis. If the individual starts with an endowment at
he produces education by moving along the curve, f(X3. The individual's
ex post measured wealth position is given by the intersection of the line
through G (with slope = with the vertical axis. Thus, if the
c
individual maximizes his measured wealth, he can consume x *goods.
However, he also consumes E* of education because the "sale" of education
does not preclude the simultaneous use of education in consumption. The
amount of education produced and sold equals the amount consumed so that
Ec =E.5If the individual were to produce E0 education, his opportunity
to purchase goods would be given by X0 and his consumption of education
would equal E0 so that he would end up at point B. It is clear that Q














E are goods. However, if the individual were to produce E1 units of
education, he would be able to consume at C. If E is a good, no unambig-
uous statement can be made with respect to the superiority of any point
between Q and C to C since this essentially depends upon the individual's
willingness to trade consumption of goods for consumption of education.6
One may describe the opportunity set through XeBQC by
(1)c h(X, Xe) =e+ [f(X)]PE —
SinceE =(X)is monotonic and continuous, there exists an inverse
function X =f1(E)so that (1) can be rewritten as
(2)X =g(E,Xe) =Xe+ EPE —f(E)
If E enters the utility function at all, the consumptive optimum can occur
at Q only if there is a kink in g(E,Xe) at point Q. But since f(X)
is differentiable and non—zero, the inverse of f(X) is also differentiable.
Thus, g(E,Xe) is differentiable throughout so that no kink can occur at
Q. This simply states that as long as education enters the utility function
(either positively or negatively), there exists some price at which the
individual is willing to trade some goods for more, or in the case where E
enters negatively, less education.7 Thus, the separation principle is
invalidated because one of the factors of wealth production, namely education,
enters the utility function directly. The individual necessarily acquires
an amount of education different than the wealth—maximizing level.
The problem facing the consumer, then, is to maximize utility given
by U =U(Xc,E)subject to the constraint that XC =g(E).Therefore,6
(3) =U(XC,E)—X[XC—g(E)]
so that the first order conditions for an optimum are given by
(4)(a) Uc—A=O
(b) UE + Ag' =0
C (c) X —g(E)=0
or,
(5) (a) UE + U' =0
(b) g(E)0
The importance of the conclusion that the optimal level of schooling
acquisition differs from the wealth maximizing level depends, of course,
on the magnitude of the effect. If UE is close to zero for all levels of
E, then most of education's effect on behavior works through its ability
to alter wages. On the other hand, it may be the case that is close
to zero. If so, education is acquired primarily because it has a positive
(direct) effect on the individual's utility. In order to ascertain the





where A is a scalar which converts units.7
The choice of the functional forms is not arbitrary. The exponential
form of (7) is natural since it yields f(0) =0,f >0and f" <0 for
o <y<1.The form of the utility function is less obvious. The main
2
reason for its choice is that it has the very unusual property that =
dE
e2x >0for all values of 0. This implies that an interior solution is
always obtained. Since we observe that individuals consume positive levels
of both c and E, this property is indeed desirable (although institu-




(8) g(E,Xc) =e+ PEE —- E11





The wealth-maximizing level of education, E*, is independent of
initial wealth because the way by which an individual will maximize his
wealth does not vary with initial endowment in the absence of capital






and upon substituting 5(b) into (11) one obtains
e X




._(XP_Xe)+ (1) (1) (X) —*
Equation(13) identifies E' and could be estimated by OLS except
that E appears on both sides of the equation. This by itself is easily
treated, but before pursuing that, a few points should be made.
First, the model gives a framework in which observed levels of
schooling can differ across individuals even though their ability levels
do not.9 This is an important aspect of the model; it does not suffer
from the drawback that all individuals are assumed to be alike and yet
obtain different levels of education. The reason that individuals differ
in their levels of schooling, at least up to this point, is that their
endowed wealth differs and their post—schooling wealth therefore differs.
Additional variation in schooling may result when it is recognized
that endowments may affect the cost of obtaining schooling. In particular,
any aspect of an individual's endowment which affects his wage rate will
certainly alter the cost of spending time at school. As found below (see
Table 1), tlendowedfl characteristics which are important in the determination
of wage rates are endowed IQ, mother's level of education and a white/non-
white dummy. Thus rewrite (7) as
(14) E =(/J(P)YKMfleXD9
where K is a measure of endowed IQ (defined below)
M is the highest grade of schooling completed by the mother
D is a dummy equal to one for whites)0
Equation (14), it should be remembered, is essentially an identity which
relates the number of years of education to cost of acquiring them.- Thus,
5, for example, measures the effect of IQ on the costs of producing education
as it works by changing the cost of time. For a given dollar expenditure,
higher ability individuals produce fewer years of education since time is
more valuable to them. Any correct measure of X will reflect this
variation.
If endowment variables affect the costs of schooling by making
individuals more productive workers, it is also reasonable to expect that
their ability to learn productive skills will be affected by these same
variables. More able individuals, for example, are expected to acquire
more units of human capital per year spent at school than less able ones.
Therefore, let the present price of a unit of education vary with the
endowment variables so that l/PE in (13) becomes
1
E
where the are unknown parameters.
So far, it has been assumed that all expenditure on education is
financed by the individual. However, some parents clearly contribute
toward financing their child's education. That part of parental aid which
is contingent upon the child's attending school reduces the cost of schooling
to the child by that same amount.12 Although it is only the child's expendi-
ture on schooling X, which directly enters the calculation of the opportunity10
set [equations (1) and (2)], it is total expenditure by parent and child
which is appropriate for the education production function. The X term
of(14) should then be replaced by where F is the proportion of
total schooling expenditure financed by parental subsidy (i.e., total
expenditure times (1—F) equals X, the expenditure of thechild).'3
Incorporating the changes, (14) becomes
AX (5 n AD (15) E= -j-j KMe
so that (8) is rewritten as
1 —(5—n—AD
(16) g(E,Xe,K,M,D) =e+ + 1K + 2M + 3D]1E — K M e




(18)E* =[( +1K + + 3D)1(- K' M1 e1 )]11
Finally, the identifying equation (13), can be rewritten as
(19) E =0(XP_Xe)+ 1K(XP_Xe) + 2M(XP_Xe) + 3D(XP_Xe)
+ofx'+1K x÷2Mx+3D fx) i
0 yE0 E 0IE 0yEJ 0
Theterm y in equation (19) is a technological and not a behavioral
parameter. It is determined exogenously from information on the costs of
attending school and should not be thought of as estimable from (19).
Theoretically, one could solve algebraically for y, (5,andAsimply11
by knowing how the endowment variables affect wages and therefore the
foregone earnings component of school costs. However, the computer can
be used more easily to find an appropriate solution for y, 6, r, and A.
Rewrite (15) as
1xp'
(20) Ln E =y 2nA + y £n—J + 6 Lu K ÷r LnM + AD
Once values of E, K, M and D are selected, X is determined by the
technological relationship between schooling costs and foregone earnings
(described in more detail below). Any five arbitrarily chosen, linearly
independent, vectors of E, K, M, and D will therefore allow one to solve
for y, A, 6, r, and A. The extent to which the solutions will vary
with different arbitrary sets of vectors depends upon how good an approxi-
mation the exponential production function is to the true production function.
One may go further and select any T number of arbitrary vectors and solve
2
for the parameters by least—squares. As R approaches 1, the exponential
approximation becomes exact and invariant to subsets of different arbitrary
vectors. This is the procedure followed below.R2 is quite high:and it
was found that the estimates of A, y, 6, r, and A were insensitive to
different sets of arbitrary vectors.
Finally, and *canbe estimated from (19) directly, and although
overidentified, maximum—likelihood techniques are easily applied to obtain
unique estimates.
Again it is clear that can conceivably be close or equal to
zero. That is, the wealth—increasing component of education can be small
or non—existent. In that case, education should be regarded simply as a
consumption good, the correlation between education and income being purely12
the result of an income effect. The framework therefore does what it sets
out to do; namely, it isolates the wealth—increasing effect of education.
In addition, since the parameters can be identified, one can solve for E*.
Thus (E —E*),the amount of education acquired in excess of the wealth—
maximizing level, is alsoidentified)4
Estimation Procedure
Before actually estimating (19), a good deal of data manipulation
must be done to resolve definitional questions. The first part of this
section is devoted to this methodologically cumbersome task. The data used
come from the National Longitudinal Survey (1966—69) on young men, 14—24
years of age in 1966. When estimating (19), a subsample was selected
such that no individual was currently attending school, nor had he attended
during the previous two years.15 E is therefore defined as the highest
grade of schooling completed.16
Direct information on IQ is not available for each individual.
However, all persons in the survey were given a test which measures their
"knowledge of the world of work," (KWW). Scores range from zero to 56
with a mean of 32.6 and a standard deviation of 9.2. Griliches (1974)
reports that this variable is highly correlated with IQ and in many cases,
17
performs better. However, it is still true that measured KWW may not
be an accurate representation of endowed ability. Since it is the endowed
values which are appropriate in a theoretical sense, KWW rather than KWW
is used as a measure of K where KWW is constructed as follows:
One would like to know what the IQ level (even measured IQ level)
would have been in the absence of schooling. That more highly schooled
individuals tend to have higher IQ's is, in part, attributable to the fact
.13
IQ tests often measure what is taught inschool.18 Onemay estimate the
effect that schooling has on measured KWW by specifying the following
relationship :19
(21) =+ + 2(S66)2 + + + 5F + a6FI
where KWW is the 1966 test score
S66 is the highest level of schooling completed in1966
D is a dummy equal to 1 for whites
N is the highest grade of school completed by the mother
F is the highest grade of school completed by the father
Fl is the median income of the father's occupation according
to the 1960 Census.
The immediate problem is one of potential simultaneity bias. That
is, not only may there be an effect of schooling on measured IQ, but there
may also be an effect of true IQ on the optimal level of schooling. Tothe
extent that measured and true IQ are correlated, simultaneity bias exists.
One way to avoid this problem is to estimate (21) for groups for which
there is no relationship between currently observed schooling levels and
optimal schooling. For example, if all individuals in the sample attended
school through grade 12, but some are still in the process of doing that,
we can measure the effect of schooling on measured IQ correctly for these
levels of schooling. Extrapolation then gives unbiased estimates of the
effect of schooling on measured IQ. This is what was done. Since in 1966,
individuals in our sample were 14—24 years old, a substantial portion were
still a long way from the school—leaving margin. Thus a sample was selected
with the following characteristics: all individuals in the sample were in14
1966 currently attending schools in a grade of 12 or less. By 1969, all
had graduated from high school. There is therefore no relationship between
the observed level of schooling in 1966 and the optimal level since all in
the sample had completed at least through 12th grade. The effect of
schooling on measured IQ is therefore given correctly by a1 and a2 of
equation (21) in Table 1. One should note in passing that mothers' education
and both fathers' education and occupational status are positively associated
with measured IQ. It comes as no surprise that measured IQ depends on race
as well.
The value of endowed measured IQ —whatmeasured IQ would have been
in the absence of schooling —cannow be estimated. Let 1(14W be defined
as (21) with S66 set equal to zero so that2°
1(14W E a0 + a3D + ct4M + a5F + a6FI
Although it is true that D, M, F and Fl affect measured IQ, we do not want
to hold these constant when defining the endowed ability level since they
are all part of the endowment themselves. (We are not claiming to find
"true" IQ, but simply endowed measured IQ where endowed means "in the
absence of schooling.")
The most difficult variable to obtain information on is e, the
endowed wealth of the individual. From Figure 1, the endowed wealth of
the individual is seen to be the level that his wealth would have been in
the absence of any schooling. The major component of e is thus the
present value of the individual's earnings stream with zero years of
education. The value of this stream is not equal for all individuals;
higher IQ persons earn higher wages even with zero years of schooling;15
individuals who grow up in the homes of highly educated parents may obtain
human capital at home even without any formal schooling; whites earn more
than blacks. To ascertain the level of wages at each age with zero years
of schooling, the following relationship can beestimated:21
(22)W69 =a+ a1S69 + a2 Age + a3 KWW + a4M + a5D + a6IS
where W69 is the wage rate in cents—per—hour during 1969 and IS is a
dummy equal to 1 for individuals who are currently attending school.
Cross—sectional estimation of (22) done in the usual way suffers from
a fundamental flaw in the context of this analysis. By calling a1 the
effect of schooling on wage rates, one assumes the answer to the question
posed; i.e., the total correlation between schooling and wage rates would
be called production. Longitudinal data allows one to avoid this problem






One can argue that the a1 obtained from (22') does not contain the effects
of income on schooling as the result of consumption. If all wage changes
are anticipated, there is no reason why more rapid wage growth during any
particular period in one's life should affect optimal schoolingconsumption.22
Even if some of the wage changes are unanticipated, the consumption bias on
a1 should be verysmall for the following reasons: First, even if this
period's wage change reflects a true change in permanent income, only a
small part of the increased consumption of schooling should take place
during this period since individuals tend to spread consumption evenly over
their lifetimes. Thus, S69 —S66induced by a given change in permanent16
income is likely to be small. Second, even if some of the wage change is
unanticipated, it is unlikely that a large part of it is unexpected. As
the unanticipated component falls, the amount ofa1 that reflects the
consumption effect falls. Finally, even if all of the wage change were
unanticipated, the elasticity of wealth with respect to the wage change
is likely to be small for two reasons. First, to the extent that the change
is regarded as a transitory phenomenon, the effect on total wealth will be
trivial. Second, even the part that is not regarded as transitory can only
affect the calculation of future wages which will lessen the elasticity of
wealth with respect to current wage changes as well.
Taking the estimates from (22) to be unbiased, one can then estimate
the constrained version of (22) to obtain unbiased estimates of
a0, a3, a4
and a5. The constrained equation is:23




For estimation, one would like to have information on individuals
throughout their lifetimes. The Census tapes, for example, provide earnings
data on individuals of all ages. Unfortunately, they do not provide data
on the crucial endowment variables. Specifically, IQ data are missing from
almost all data sets which contain variation in other variables (schooling
levels and age, especially). We are therefore forced to rely on the NLS
and to extrapolate to older age levels.2
Define W, the hourly wage in cents at age t, as the predicted
value from (22) when S69 is set equal to zero, age is set equal to t,
andIS is equal to zero.(When Wt <0,W is set equal to zero). The







=meanage of the sample
Age1 =theindividual's actual age.
(Based on a 2000 hour work year). R is a correction for vintage effects.
Since (26) is estimated from a cross—section, W overstates the obtainable
wage at age tforindividuals who are older than the sample mean age and
understates if for those who are younger. The annual vintage effect is
estimated elsewhere
25to be 1.3% per year.26 Estimates of the wage and
27
IQ eqiations are contained in Table 1.
It is now necessary to measure X, the value of resources used In
the production of schooling. Let the cost to the individual of attending
the jth grade of schooling be approximated by
(24) =l.5C.—T.where
3 3 3
C. is the indirect (foregone wage) cost associated with the jth year of
schooling and T is the financial aid obtained from the parent. Assume









where is the total cost to the individual of acquiring schooling





























Constant 18.71 86.33 —560.6
(3.94) (59.8)
.2069 .0412 .0486
N 1245 1722 1722






Note: Standard errors in parentheses Those in (22") are uncorrectec for
variance introduced by the constraint.19
The indirect cost of schooling, C, consists of hours spent in
school times the price of time. Hours spent in school is approximated
by the following linear function, consistent with 25 hours per week at
grade 1 to 58 hours per week at grade 18.29
(27) 11(j) =830+ 70j
The price of time can be estimated by examining the wage rates of
individuals who are not currently attending school. In order to find the
price of time during, say, the 11th grade, one can look at the mean wage
of individuals who are not currently enrolled in school and whose highest
level of education is grade 10. It is possible, however, that individuals
in these two groups are not alike with respect to other variables which
influence the wage rate. For example, those who remain in school may have
higher values of KWW than those out of school. Since KWW enters (22),
correction for this must be made in calculating the price of time. Define
W. as the corrected wage rate for the ith individual during the jth year
of school. As above, W. is the predicted wage rate for individual i
from (22) where S69 is set equal to j—i, age is equal to j+5 and KWW,
Nand Dassume their actual values. (IS is equal to zero since the
wage rate understates the price of time for those in school by minus the
coefficient of IS). So
(28)Wc =[—560.6+ 2.67(j—1) + 28.7(j+5) + 7.134 KWW+ 3.388M+ 67g2D]R.1_Age
By using this corrected wage (which varies over years of schooling)
one can obtain an estimate of the cost to each individual of his actual




(29)x. =1.5(1—F)EH(j)(.Q1W) [i+ioj •
Finally,one needs a measure of F. Since by assumption, T./l.5C
is constant over all j, we can take T to be the current year's financial
aid from the parent where jrefers to the 1969 schooling level. A problem
immediately arises. In order to have a well—defined F, the individual must
currently be attending school. However, to estimate (19), the sample is to
be restricted to those not attending school in 1969 (or during the previous
two years) so that F is not obtainable for this sample.
As above, the solution is to estimate T. by regressing it on
exogenous endowment variables M, D, F, Fl, NFAN and(NFAN)2 where NFM{
is the number of members in the individual's family other than himself.
(KWW is excluded since it is a linear combination of other included variables).
The sample for estimation purposes is restricted to those individuals for
whom non—zero values of T. were obtained.30 The results are contained in
J
Table 2. The only important variable in the determination of T was the
number of other family members. Most significantly, there seems to be no
relationship between parental wealth and the level of transfer forschooling.31
This suggests that parental—wealth related schooling cost differences across
individuals may well be small.(This does not state, of course, that all
cost differences are small. Schools are more likely to give scho1arships,
for example, to more able individuals).
Estimation of (20) is now a simple matter. As described above,
arbitrary vectors of E, M, K and D can be used to generate the solutions
for A, y, S, r, A. Observations from the NLS sample were used as the21
arbitrary vectors. The results are contained in Table 2 and yield the
following estimates: y.2061; A =963,400=—.5659;r =—.0478;
and A =—.0019.The selection of different subsets of vectors yielded
very similar coefficients.
We are now ready to estimate equation (19). There are two diff i—
culties encountered. First, E appears on both sides of the equation so
that the independent variables are not uncorrelated with the error. The
solution to this is to use a two—stage estimation procedure. The first
stage consists of obtaining predicted values for the right—hand variables
by regressing them on a set of instruments. Then E is regressed on the
predicted values to obtain unbiased estimates of the coefficients in (19).
Since everything in the model depends fundamentally on a few exogenous
endowment variables——M, F, Fl, NFAN, D——we know that there is some under-
lying polynomial expression which expresses E as a function of these
variables and approximates the analytical solution to (19). We therefore
use as instruments the terms of a second degree polynomial formed from the
endowment variables. Since these are uncorrelated with the error term,
tye produce consistent estimates.
The second difficulty involves the overidentification of the param-
eters of (19) caused by the non—linear structure. The two—stage estimation
process above gives consistent estimates of 1/0 and l from the intercept
and first four coefficients, respectively. However, a method analogous to
the Durbin two—stage technique of time series analysis produces estimates
which incorporate the information of the non—linear constraint. Using the






























Sample Criterion Complete information Complete information,
in school and >0
The actual value of [1.5 c(11)J+5]from (29) is used here
since the 1-F terms cancel.J23
(30)E + *= 0(XP_Xe+ + 1(XP_Xe + + 2(XP_Xe +
O1E OyE OyE
e X + 3(X-X + z)D.
OyE
The same 2SLS procedure used to estimate (19) can now be used to obtain
consistent etimates of whose efficiency exceed that of the initial
The results are presented in Table 3.






Additional Results and Implications
The most important finding is that 0 <0;education is a bad! This
does not imply, of course, that education provides no positive utility at
any level, but simply states that the representative individual pushes
consumption of education to the point where he would no longer accept it
at zero cost. I.e., if someone were to offer to cover the cost of schooling



































Sample Criterion Out of school for past 2 years, complete in— S
formationE￿025
future wages would remain unaltered by schooling, the offer would be
declined. Optimal schooling falls short of the wealth—maximizing level.
It is also found that and
and thatwhites receive a higher return
=o+]K + 2M +
= +1K + 2M + 3D)1K =.82
or =$102at the point of means. Similarly,
=2O+ 1K + 2M + 3D)1M =.80
or =$307.
Both changes in measured IQ and changes in parental education have large
and similar effects on the returns to education. More can be said on this.
From Table 1, one can calculate the wage elasticity (given education) with
respect to N and K. At the mans, -. .67while - =.11.
Although the effect of IQ on wages is similar to that of IQ on education,
parental education seems to be much more important in influencing the
returns to schooling than in affecting wage rates. This seems reasonable.
Ability (especially as KWW measures it) is likely to be a more generally
applicable asset than is parental education. The latter might be expected
to have specific components and one is not surprised that additional
parental education is most useful in teaching children how to benefit from
schooling.
aPEare positive and substantial
to education than do blacks. Since26
The fact that 0 <0,i.e., that education is considered a bad,
implies that the wealth—maximizing level of education, E*, should exceed
the optimal level of education. From (18), one can solve for E* directly.
At the means, a white individual's wealth—maximizing level of education is
16.0 years. The mean level of attained education among whites is 11.9 years.
Individuals tend to quit school after high school even though the wealth—
maximizing stopping point is college graduation because they regard school
attendance as an unpleasant activity. The calculation for blacks reveals
that the mean level of for blacks is only 70% of the mean for
whites. This is consistent with other results on black/white returns to
schooling during the late 60's. The mean black's wealth—maximizing level
of education is 15.5 years; he acquires 10.3 years of education so that
both the actual and wealth—maximizing levels of education are lower for
blacks than whites. Although the costs of attending school are lower for
blacks (foregone earnings are lower) this is more than offset by the smaller
returns to schooling that accrue to blacks.
One can perform the same analysis with respect to differences in
the KWW and M variables. Differentiating (18) with respect to K one
obtains:
(31) [(+1K ++ 3D)1( KMe)]
—1
K M1/e(0 + 1K + +
— + 1K + +
Evaluation at theaeans yields =—.284so =..50.Similarly,
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M =.242and •= .14.This result is consistent with the above
discussion. Since parental education affects the returns to schooling by
a much greater amount than it affects wage rates (and the cost of schooling),
it makes sense that individuals with more educated parents should have
higher wealth—maximizing levels of schooling. However, since the effect of
higher ability on returns to schooling is similar to that of parental educa-
tion, while ability plays a much more important role in raising wages, the
3E*
negative --canbe reconciled with the positive
This does not i ply that one should observe a negative correlation
between schooling and IQ. There are two reasons: First, observed IQ is
directly and positively affected by schooling so that it may be the case
that the higher observed IQ individuals actually have lower endowed IQ's.
But this is not necessary. Even if observed IQ were a perfect measure of
endowed IQ, the attained level of education may be higher for higher IQ
individuals even though the wealth—maximizing level is not. In terms of
Figure 1, this could happen if the situation were the one pictured in
Figure 2. Here individual 2 is the high ability worker. Although E*1 >E,
Ec2 > because the high ability opportunity set is higher and steeper
than the low ability opportunity set.
We therefore want to consider the realtionship between the optimal
E and K and M. The difficulties involved in solving (19) explicitly
for E have already been mentioned. However, the implicit function theorem
allows us to describe its behavior without obtaining an explicit solution.
Write (19) as
(32)Q(E, K, M, D, X, Xe) =( +K + 2M + 3D)(XP_Xe +






Theterms on the right hand side are easily evaluated.
e aX 1 xp
= ÷
+ 82M + 3D) (-k--
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axp 6x
The inverse of (15) implies that =— = 305at the point of means.


















The optimal level of schooling and endowed ability are negatively
related at the means. Yet, one observes a positive relationship between
measured ability and attained schooling. This suggests that the observation
is to a large extent the result of measurement error which alters ex post
measured ability, but not endowed measured ability. Table 4 reveals that
the average level of KWW is very stable across schooling levels. This
simple correlation of zero between KWW and E lends some support to the
reasonableness of the result.32 Also, it should be remembered that
holds other things as parental education and wealth constant. Since endowed
ability and other background variables are likely to be positively related,
a negative partial but zero simple correlation between endowed ability
andschoolingis indeed re.asonable.3330
In the same way, -canbe calculated. At the point of means,
dE dEM =.20and -•= .16.The optimal level of education and parental
education vary directly. Holding ability and other background variables
constant, more educated parents can be expected to have more educated
children. Neither the simple nor partial relationship is surprising.
We observe that blacks on average opt for about 1.6 fewer years of
schooling than do whites. It is also the case that the average value of
M is 8.0 for blacks and 10.1 for whites and that the average KWW is
similarly 26.6 and 28.4 respectively. From the above calculations, one
can approximate the amount of additional education that blacks would obtain





The effect is trivial. The effect of blacks lower KWW almost exactly
offsets that of their lower value of M. Part of the residual is the
result of differences in mean F which is .004 for blacks and .015 for
whites. Most of the difference, however, results from much lower returns
to schooling for blacks than for whites.
The question was orginally posed in terms of wealth and education,
while discussion up to this point has been cast in terms of endowment
variables and education. The reason is straightforward. The way by which
an individual's wealth varies in this model is through interpersonal
differences in ability or background which alter the expected lifetime
earnings stream. This implies that it is misleading to talk about a pure
wealth effect on education since wealth cannot change without also changing
the cost of education, i.e., without shifting the education production
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function. There exists no conceptual experiment analogous to a pure
increase in wealth when discussing education. When wealth changes, so
must prices.
The original question can now be answered. "Is the correlation
between education and wealth the result of consumption or production?'t Part
of the answer has already been presented. Individuals do not appear to
attend school for consumption purposes. School attendance appears to be
justified by its ability to affect wealth. The fact that 97% of all
individuals in the sampel had a negative E_E* attests to this.
Table 4 reveals an important fact. The wealth—maximizing and observed
level of schooling are positively correlated and IE_E*I falls as E increases.
For individuals with E >18,the mean level of E exceeds E*. These
individuals push education beyond the wealth—maximizing level. This suggests
that at least for individuals who achieve high levels of education, (e.g.,
M.A.'s and Ph.D. 's), schooling is considered a good. Firm conclusions on
this cannot be reached, however, without appropriately segregating the sample.34
Additional information is obtained by considering the regressions in
Table 5. The results of (34) show that although there is a strong positive
association between E and E*, only 6—1/2% of the total variation in E
is explained by varitiOfl in E*. There is a great deal of residual variation
left to explain. Part of this variance can be explained by consumption while
part is simply "randon error."
Regressions (35) and (36) verify the consistency of the last few pages
worth of calculations. From (35), one sees that the partial relationship
between K and N and E* are negative and positive, respectively. From
(36), we find that the partial relationships between K and M and E are32
TABLE 1
HighestGradeof KWW M EE* c(E*,) =a(E-E*) E*
SchoolingCompleted (1) (2) (3) (14) (5)
6 28.9 5.37 -8.0 .75 114.0
7 28.14 6.91 —8.1 1.314 15.0
8 27.0 7.32 —8.3 1.6 16.3
9 27.5 7.99 —7.3 1.6 16.3
10 28.5 8.87 -6.0 2.0 16.0
11 27.6 9.41 -5.6 1.3 16.6
12 27.9 9.76 —14.7 1.7 16.7
13 28.1 11.1 —14.1 1.2 17.1
114 29.1 11.6 —2.7 2.5 16.7
15 27.2 11.9 —2.7 1.3 17.7
16 28.14 12.0 —1.5 1.14 17.5
17 27.7 11.6 —0.2 0.9 17.7
>18 28.1+ 12.5 +0.3 1.3 17.7
Total11.7 27.9 9.56 —4.9 ci(E) =1.7 16.6
a(E—E*) =2.5
Whites12.0 28.5 10.2 o(E*) 1.7 16.8
Non-







*There were no observations in the subsample for which E <6and very

































R2 .065 .692 .200
SEE 2.20 .969 2.04
N 1636 1636 163634
also negative and positive, respectively. Blacks have lower levels of
E and E* than do whites. All signs correspond to those predicted in
the analysis of previous pages. These findings again support the claim
that variance in observed E moves in the direction predicted by the
utility maximizing framework set out in this paper. Furthermore, since
K, M and D by themselves can, even in this simple equation, explain 20%
of the variation in E, differences in wealth—maximizing levels of education
across individuals (as formulated in this model) tell only part of the story.
This does not say that the investment motive is unimportant. The findings
of this paper suggest that it is supreme. Virtually all education is
wealth—increasing. We simply find that variations in E* across individuals
do not go far to explain variations in E.
The robustness of the obtained results was tested by altering
various assumptions made throughout the model. The first variation allowed
KWW to depend on age as well as schooling. The results were virtually
identical to those previously obtained: 1/0 =—22.51, =.000778,
=—.0000080,2 =—.0000231,3 =—.0000743,y =.1931.This resulted
in =$3816and E* of 15.7 at the mean.
Second, the discount rate was changed to .05 from .10.became
.2001 and l/e=—25.12.All other coefficients changed almost propor-
tionately to 1/3 their original values. This resulted in $10,526
(higher because of the lower discount rate), but E* increased only to
17.3 years from 16.0. All other qualitative conclusions were the same.
Thus, even with such drastic alteration of the discount rate, the findings
remain intact.
Third, the hours—in—school equation was assumed to be 2/3 of its
original magnitude, thereby lowering the cost of a year of schooling.35
Again, all coefficients in (30) change by a scalar, fell to $2136,
but 1/0 is still negative at —28.62 and E* remains at 16.1. Again,
all previous statements hold.
Finally, the assumption on direct costs of schooling was changed.
Instead of direct costs being one—half of foregone earnings, they were
assumed to be zero through grade 12. This did not affect the results at
all. All coefficients were very similar, E =$2891and E* was 16.0
years again for the mean individual.
One final check on the reasonableness of the results can be made
by examining the predicted wealth from (2). Evaluating all terms at the
means, one obtains that E =$3571and =$57,305.At the assumed
10% rate of interest this yields a permanent annual income (consumption)
figure of $5730. This seems in line with casual notions of average
permanent income. In addition sincee =$18,557,schooling triples
the wealth of the representative individual.
As a final point, it is now useful to consider the welfare effects
of government subsidization of education. One of the primary motivations
of government subsidization seems to be the redistribution of opportunity
if not wealth. If it were the case that education did not enter the
utility function at all, then individuals would necessarily go to their
wealth—maximizing levels. Redistributive arguments for giving education
to the poor instead of assets paying the market rate of interest would
have to rest on differences in the cost of obtaining funds across individ-
uals (ignoring externalities).35 Since education enters the utility
function negatively, however, the individual stops short of the wealth—
maximizing level of education. This means that education yields a higher36
pecuniary return at the margin than do other assets (the difference
being the value of the marginal disutility). By subsidizing education,
the government could induce individuals to move to the wealth—maximizing
level of education. If the only objective were to raise pecuniary wealth
of particular individuals, this method would yield a higher return than
the same amount of transfer expenditure in non—human capital. It is still
true, however, that the utility level of the recipients would be lower
when the transfer is in education (a non—saleable asset) rather than in
bonds.
The results of the above analysis allow us to calculate the amount
of subsidy necessary to move the mean individual to the wealth—maximizing
level of education. Since '(E*_E) =4.9years, the government should
set as an approximation --frdX=4.9(since 3E/X varies with X',
this is only an approximation). dX is, like parental transfer, an





so that dX =$6872in period zero dollars. Since this occurs at the
average school quitting age of about 18, in age 18 current dollars the
expenditure is [e 8)][6872] =$41,575,a substantial subsidy. The
exact expenditures varies across individuals. Table 4 reveals that IE_E*I
is greater for non—whites than it is whites. The wealth—maximizing scheme
would therefore require that a larger subsidy go to non—white individuals.
Similary, since =—.28and -= —.23,the difference between E and
E* decreases with increased ability. The required subsidy would therefore
.37
be larger for low ability workers. It should be remembered, of course,
that all would be better off with a non—wealth—maximizing transfer of
money of the corresponding amount than with an educational subsidy. Only
if wealth—maximization is an end by itself is the educational subsidy
warranted (again, neglecting externalities) 36
Summary and Conclusions
The question posed in this paper is an old one: Why attend school?
Does the well—documented relationship between education and income result
because schooling allows individuals to earn higher wages or because high
income individuals purchase more schooling as they purchase more of all
normal goods? The first part of the paper sets out a theoretical framework
which treats education as a joint product, producing (potential) wage
gains and utility, independent of the wealth increment, simultaneously.
If education enters the utility function either positively or negatively,
it is necessarily the case that the optimal level of education will differ
from the wealth—maximizing level. It is thus misleading to ask how much
of educational acquisition is due to consumption. The answer is, "all of
it." The appropriate question is how large is the difference between the
consumption optimum and wealth—maximizing level? This will be zero if
education does not enter the utility function and will be equal to the
attained level if education does not affect wealth.
The choice of general functional forms for the uitlity and educa-
tional production function allows one to ascertain the relevant magnitudes.
The model, which uses information on parental education and occupation,
number of siblings, race, and endowed (in the absence of schooling) measured38
IQ, produces estimates of the optimal and wealth—maximizing levels of
education, andthemarket value of education. The way in which these
values are affected by differences in the background variables is also
determined.
One of the most difficult problems encountered was to obtain a
measure of endowed ability. A method is devised which nets Out the effect
of schooling on measured IQ independent of the simultaneity bias which
results from potential causality between true IQ and the optimal level of
schooling. The solution rests on the use of longitudinal data (the
National Longitudinal Survey on young men is used) which follows individuals
over a portion of their lifetimes.
The fourth section contains the results of the analysis. The findings
can be summarized:
1. Most important is the finding that education is a bad, i.e., it
enters negatively into the utility function. Individuals therefore stop
short of the wealth—maximizing level of education by an average of 4.9
years. While high school graduation is the average quitting point, acqui-
sition of an undergraduate degree is still a whorthwhile investment for
the mean individual.
2. The wealth—maximizing level of education varies inversley with
endowed IQ and directly with parental education. Although increases in
both imply increased returns to a year of schooling, they also imply higher
costs as well as the result of higher foregone earnings. Increases in
endowed IQ effect wages to a larger extent than returns to education while
the opposite is true for parental education. Similary, the wealth—maximizing
level of education is lower for blacks than for whites.
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3. It is also the case that the simple correlation between endowed
(as opposed to ex post measured) IQ and the level of attained schooling
is zero. ThJs suggests that there is no tendency for higher education to
be dominated by the more intelligent. The partial relationship between
IQ and optimal schooling is, in fact, negative. This results from two
factors: First, the cost of schooling is higher to the more able due to
higher foregone earnings. Second, the more able are richer and as such
acquire less of schooling, a normal bad. Parental education is both in a
simple and partial sense, positively associated with attained schooling.
Similarly, the model predicts (as well as observes) that blacks will
acquire less education than whites. This result attains even when correc-
tions are made for differences in parental education and endowed measured
ability. The difference is caused by much lower returns to schooling for
blacks than for whites.
4. Although the wealth—maximizing level of education and actual
level of education are positively related, variation in the former explains
only 6—1/2% of variation in the latter. Actual levels of education move
with the endowment variables in the way predicted by the analysis. This
suggests that part of the residual is explained by differences in the
consumptive optimum across individuals. It is true, however, that 97% of
the sample stopped short of the wealth—maximizing level.
5. An educational subsidy of $6872 in present value at birth would
cause the mean individual to acquire the wealth—maximizing level of education.
The model presented in this paper is empirically complicated and
requires many assumptions before any conclusions are obtained. To the
extent that extrapolation results in rough measures of important variables,40
the final conclusions must be regarded as less than definitive. On the
otherhand, the tests for robustness revealed that the results were
quite stable even when important assumptions were changed substantially.
Many checks on the reasonableness of the findings have also been provided
and the model performed quite well by these criteria. The assessment of
the finding's credibility, of course, rests with the reader.
.
SFOOTNOTES
1. See Arrow (1972), Stiglitz (1973) and Wolpin (1974) for a more complete
discussion of this hypothesis.
2. Levhari and Weiss (1974) offer an alternative explanation. They show
that under conditions of uncertainty with decreasing absolute risk
aversion, an increase in initial wealth will encourage investment in
more human capital since the wealthier will buy more risky assets
(human capital being one).
3. Schultz (1962) describes the benefits to education as divisible into
three components: an investment component which results in an increase
in an individual's measured wealth; a present consumption component such
as the utility currently derived, say, from attending class; and a future
consumption component which results from the fact that education improves
one's ability to consume other goods later in life.
4. This amounts to assuming that additional years of schooling produce
slightly more units of human capital where a unit of human capital
is defined such that its rental price in current dollars is constant
for each period of rental. The increase in the number of units of
human capital is then assumed to exactly offset the decline in the
value of human capital acquired later in life'which results from a
shorter payoff period. Note that this assumption does not imply a
constant "rate of return" since the education production function, f(X),
allows the costs of producing education to rise with E.
5. This assumes that "education" is the appropriately defined good. Specif i—
cally, this requires that there are no possibilities of different types
of education, some of which are more productiie in the market, some of
which are more productive in the non—market.
6. One is not indifferent between C and B, however, since measured
wealth (i.e., ability to purchase goods) is the same at each point,
but the amount of education consumed at C exceeds that of point B.
7. Ishikawa (1973) obtains a similar conclusion.
8.Some experimentation was done with other utility functions (Cobb—Douglas,
among others), but all lacked the necessary properties and the results
obtained were therefore non—sensical.
9. As Rosen (1973) points out, the assumptions of the human capital frame-
work as applied empirically generally preclude the observation of
different levels of schooling across individuals.
4142
10. D is entered exponentially since DA would imply E =0for
non—whites.
11. One might also argue that tastes differ across individuals, depending
upon the values of the endowment variables. For simplicity, neutrality
of tastes is assumed with respect to endowment variables. That is,
although it is recognized that higher IQ individuals may derive greater
absolute utility from both E and X, it is assumed that the ratio
of marginal utilities (OXC) is independent of K, M and D.
12. The child generally receives some parental transfers even in the
absence of attending school. It is the amount by which this transfer
increases when the child attends school which should be thought of as
school cost financed by the parent.
13. Becker (1967) argues that schooling differences across individuals can
be caused either by differences in returns to schooling or differences
in costs. Treating as variable addresses the former while incor-
porating parental financing attempts to deal with the latter. Differ-
ences in borrowing rates are ignored only to the extent that they do
not operate through parental transfers.
14. The difference between observed E and E* does not accurately reflect
the amount of educationdue exclusivelY to consumption. The true con-
sumption component is E —E*where E is the solution to (19) in
terms of E for each individual. Not all of unexplained variation
should be called consumption since some of it is the result of error
in the calculation of E*.
15. Given that these individuals are young, there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that they will return to school even if not currently attending.
This may cause E to be mismeasured. Dealing with young individuals
has the advantage, however, that X, the costs of schooling, can be
more accurately measured than they can for older individuals whose
schooling occuiredfurther into the past.
16. Observations are selected for which E > 0. E > 18 is coded as E 18.
17. "Better" is defined in the context of wage functions. It is not clear
that it will do as well as a measure of the ability to produce educa-
tion. In the absence of a superior measure, however, it must suffice.
18. If all individuals attended the same number of years of schooling, the
problem would be less serious since the more able would learn these
testable skills more readily.
19. Griliches and Mason (1972) are faced with much the same problem and
this technique is not totally unlike theirs.




measure uses the information in the error term and would be superior
if the error primarily reflected unestimated differences in measured43
ability rather than unestimated differences in the effect of schooling
on measured ability. This measure contains more information on the
individual, but is also less likely to be free of schooling effects.
The inclusion of age in the KWW equation changed none of the results.
This is discussed in more detail in the final sections.
21. Neither CS69)2, F, nor Fl entered significantly into the regression.
See Lazear (1974) for a discussion of the IS variable.
22. Nor is there any reason to expect that wage growth and average wage
levels will be correlated if schooling does not affect wages. E.g.,
the more able may have flatter earnings profiles in the absence of
schooling than the less able, even though the level of the former's
wages are higher.
23. This specification is tantamount to the assumption of neutrality. That
is, the effect of,age, for example, on wage rates istrted here as
being independent of schooling. If age is a proxy for on—the—job
training, this says that schooling has no effect on the cost of invest-
ment in OJT because it increases efficiency in producing this form of
human capital by the same amount as it increases the costs of producing
it (the foregone earnings, primarily). Experimentation with functional
forms revealed the absence of interaction effects so that neutrality
in this context may not be far from the truth.
24. This problem is not as serious as it appears since the inaccuracies at
later ages are to a large extent mitigated by the present value cal-
culation which renders them small relative to the earlier component.
25. See Lazear (1975), p. 11.
26. This calculation appears to have ignored the effect of parental wealth
on the child's endowed wealth. This is not the case. Fl was allowed
to affect wage rates directly in (22), but did not enter significantly.
Fl enters indirectly by altering 1(14W. The direct transfer of funds
from wealthy parents to their children is taken into account by the
introduction of F in (15).
27. The fact that only a small portion of the variation in wages is explained
in (22") is not too disturbing. As long as the individual has no better
information about the rest of wage variation than we do, it can be
ignored since he will not take it into account in estimating his own
endowment.
28. The assumption that direct costs are one—half foregone earnings was
replaced by the assumption that they are zero through year 12 and
half of foregone earnings beyond that. The results were not altered.
This is discussed in more detail in the final section.
In addition, changing the discount rate to .05 from .10 did not
qualitatively alter the results.44
29. Equation (27) was replaced by H(j) =.66(830+ 70.) and the complete
analysis was carried out. Again, the results chaned very little
(as is reported below). The robustness of the findings in light of
such apparently substantial changes in assumptions is encouraging.
30. The data do not distinguish between a true value of zero and a zero
value for insufficient information. This prevented the application
of tobit analysis.
31. A linear probability regression with the same independent variables
and the dependent variable being a dummy equal to 1 when T >0
yielded similar results. The sample was restricted to those currently
attending school so that the T =0was less likely to reflect
insufficient information. No variable in this regression entered
significantly and all coefficients (although biased) were very small.
32. Nor is this theresult of a mechanical relationship. It is not true
that because KWW is constructed by holding schooling constant that
there must be no relationship between the two. There are two reasons:
The coefficient on the schooling coefficient in the KWW regression is
not obtained cross—sectionally. Given the construction of the sample
for estimation of (21), the correlation between optimal (final)
schooling and KWW is removed. Thus, taking this effect out says
nothing about cross—sectional findings on KWW. Second, D, F, and Fl
enter significantly and are not held constant by Table 4. Even if
the partial correlation between KW and E were zero, there would be
no reason for the simple correlation to be zero.
33. This finding which suggests that the truly bright individuals are out
in the real world earning money rather than ivory—towering their time
away, is sure to please a large part of the population. Before conceding
the issue, however, two points should be made. If it is true that
the more able take the returns to schooling in non—pecuniary ways, then
the measured returns understate true returns by more for the more able.
This might lead to the prediction that optimal levels of schooling
and ability are negatively correlated when the reverse is true. One
wonders, of course, why it is that the more able should have a relative
preference for non—pecuniary returns. Higher tax rates on higher
income is the usual explanation. No additional justifications are
offered here.
34. An attempt to stratify the sample into low and high education groups
was only partially successful. Observations were split into these
obtaining more than twelve years of schooling and those obtaining
less than twelve years. For the low schooling groups, the following
results were obtained: y =.1561,1/0 =— 23.98,= .000705,l =.0000089,
=—.0000211,3 —.0000747. These coefficients are similar to
those in the text, but yield E =3508(as compared to $3571 for the
group as a whole) and E* =13.4(rather than 16.0). This is consistent
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with the group being low—schooled individuals. For the high schooling
group, only 300 observations were present. This resulted in y =.3961,
=—.00000276,2 =—.0000061,3 =—.0000036.Although the
coefficients retain the same signs and qualitative implications,
becomes 7092 and E* a ridiculous 51 years! This is directly attributable
to the high y and presumably to the insufficient information in the
few observations.
35. If the government could finance education at 10% while some individuals
faced 15% borrowing rates then what was wealth—maximizing at the
private level would fall short of what was wealth—maximizing at the
social level.
36. Wealth—maximization could be a goal in itself if a country were trying
to produce maximum output en route to a developed state. In such a
case, leaving school prior to the wealth—maximizing level is analogous
to failing to build a machine whose return exeeds cost..
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